The Diplomatic Digest: Second Issue
Editor’s Note
Dear reader,
As we approach the end of the semester and coincidentally the end of the year, we wanted to thank you for your support and warm feedback following our last issue. The numbers of views (and hopefully regular readers!) has skyrocketed compared to last year and we couldn’t thank you enough for that. As editors, we can only vow to keep the standard of the Digest as high as possible and create a Digest worthy of your time. We’ve even increased the number of staff dedicated to this Digest and they waited no time in producing some incredible articles. We also wanted to thank our counterparts at the Oxford Diplomatic Dispatch for publishing a few articles by our very own students at LUISS as part of our new partnership in order to foster international collaboration between our two publications. We strongly encourage you to go check out their thought-provoking 20th issue over at their website (you can click on the link here).
In this edition of the Diplomatic Digest, we look at what happens when the promises of the “rules-based order” collide with the reality of power. Our authors take us from Trump’s Venezuela gambit and the long genocide in Darfur to Gaza, where international law itself is being stress-tested. They examine how India’s outreach to the Taliban, Germany’s unresolved East–West divide, and the UK’s offshoring of migration control to France reshape borders and responsibility. Some of the other pieces zoom out to question the words we use, like the empty use of “sustainability” and the idea that the Green Deal will hurt Europe’s competitiveness. They also focus on communities, like the Romani people, whose very existence makes nation-states uncomfortable. Together, these articles don’t offer easy answers; they map the fault lines where diplomacy, law and lived experience now meet.
We hope, dear reader, that you will enjoy this second Diplomatic Digest as much as we did writing it.
Your Editors-in-chief,
Gonzalo Rodao & Cristiano Nardelli
Come check out the LUSDA’s Instagram to see what are our next events. Also, register to the form in our website to become a LUSDA member, and enter in the WhatsApp group to stay updated on the Digest and LUSDA’s activities.
The Editorial Team
Gonzalo Rodao & Cristiano Nardelli
Editors
Flora Jannotti Testa
Konstantin Zametica
Giulia Diurni
Judith Wyplosz
Sofia Giandomenico
Tristan Pascal
Beatrice Bianchi
Journalists
In This Issue
Articles
The Taliban’s Diplomatic Façade
How India’s 2025 Visit Normalized a Regime That Excludes Women
By Judith Wyplosz
36 Years After the Fall of the Berlin Wall
Is Germany Still Divided Between West And East?
By Beatrice Bianchi
30 Years of Genocide
Sudan’s Endless Crisis and the Fall of Darfur
By Sofia Giandomenico
Sustainability: What Does it Really Mean?
Beyond Buzzwords: Rebuilding a Concept of Responsibility
By Cristiano Nardelli
Romani People and Their Place in the Global Order
A Stateless Nation’s Struggle for Dignity and Recognition
By Konstantin Zametica
Will International Law Survive Gaza? Insights from Prof. Michaelsen
Four Paradigms for Understanding a Legal Crisis
By Giulia Diurni
The United Kingdom and Its Externalising Migration Management with France
How the Channel Became a Shared Frontier
By Tristan Pascal
Columns
Prove Me Wrong
Invade Venezuela, You Say? Wait, I’ve Seen This One Before!
By Gonzalo Rodao
Have Your Cake and Eat It Too?
The Green Transition vs. Competitiveness
By Flora Jannotti Testa
Careers Flash
The Taliban’s Diplomatic Façade
How India’s 2025 Visit Normalized a Regime That Excludes Women
By Judith Wyplosz
In October 2025, India hosted a weeklong Taliban Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi in New Delhi. Since 2021, it has been the first visit by a senior Taliban leader. Muttaqi is sanctioned by the UN for travelling and for having diplomatic commitments abroad. During the meetings, women were excluded in accordance with Taliban norms, even though India formally guarantees gender equality. This event was groundbreaking for a democratic state to adopt Taliban customs, to follow full protocol and open a channel to sign deals.
On the regional stage, it normalized the Taliban regime, which is not even recognized and is condemned for gender apartheid. They are gaining legitimacy amid the contradiction of maintaining a diplomatic façade while their repressive realities persist. It raises the issue of whether these new regional ties can shape the Taliban’s conduct or simply solidify their legitimacy.
After 20 years of Western presence in Afghanistan, the ‘Taliban 2.0’ took power back in Kabul in August 2021. The absence of recognition of the Taliban regime by the international community has resulted in concrete economic and diplomatic sanctions from the UN and the West. The Afghan economy is paralyzed by frozen reserves, travel bans and listed as a terrorist organisation. “Gender apartheid” has been declared by Amnesty International in continuation of the UNAMA reports provided by the UN. In the 1990s, only Pakistan, the UAE and Saudi Arabia had been recognised. Today, the Taliban would need much more recognition to survive and develop their economy. Thus, they have expanded their relationships with regional diplomacy to escape isolation.
Qatar is one of the main mediators and diplomatic hubs, hosting the Taliban political office and the 2020 Doha talks between the US and the Taliban. It still offers the Taliban a place to meet, and its money and networks are seen as possible ways to influence them. Without granting formal recognition, there is no clear evidence that this has moderated Taliban policies on women or governance (UNAMA). Similarly, key figures from the Taliban movement have been welcomed by the UAE. The priority is geopolitics over morality, as shown by June’s discussions on “cooperation” and “regional stability.” Their interests are security, influence in Afghanistan, and competition with other Gulf actors or Pakistan.
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia was aligned with the American strategy post 2001 and is now much more prudent towards Afghanistan. The objective is to be perceived as a potential mediator rather than to position itself directly as a moral arbiter. The Muslim world considers the Taliban as indispensable interlocutors, who are gaining political visibility and financial partnerships. Still, in their negotiations, these actors do not pressure to ameliorate women’s rights, do not ask for shared power, nor moderate their governance (UNAMA).
China sees Afghanistan as a corridor for extending CPEC/BRI and as a security buffer to prevent Uyghur militants from training or conducting organised attacks. It also plays a role in stopping the regional spreading of jihadism between Pakistan and the Taliban with trilateral talks to calm border tensions and protect its investments. Delving further, Russia is the first country to officially recognise the Taliban government on July 3, 2025. It removed them from its terrorist list in April 2025. They collaborate to encourage other states to normalise relations. Both declared jointly a “just multipolar order“, prevailing state sovereignty over universal human rights.
Iran was at first worried about the Taliban as anti-Shia extremists on its border. Today, Tehran adopted a pragmatic approach, maintaining its embassy in Kabul without recognition. In 2025, a large economic delegation aims to raise funding from $3.5 billion to $10 billion for mining, banking ties, and the use of the Chabahar port. This is a vital sea access for landlocked Afghanistan, adding a crucial trade corridor that avoids Pakistan. Tensions over water disputes and border incidents are now managed through diplomacy.
India used to consider Taliban 1.0 (1996-2001) as a direct security threat due to their proximity to Pakistan. After 2001, India invested heavily in infrastructure. Since 2021, it has welcomed them, kept humanitarian aid, but has temporarily withdrawn. The hope is that maintaining regular engagement will eventually moderate repression. However, each visit grants them de facto legitimacy while they have made no progress at all. A way to reduce its economic dependence on Pakistan is to focus on this and on Central Asia.
The US and the EU are forced to engage even if they are still on the US terrorist list. It was made possible thanks to the Doha channel in Qatar, which facilitated discreet dialogue.
Many states maintain embassies, sign trade deals, and invite them. Only Russia has given formal de jure recognition. At the same time, regional actors prioritize security, access to minerals, and geopolitical influence in a post-US order. The Taliban regime is treated as a normal government by its major neighbour despite its ideology. Engagement does not moderate the regime; instead, it increases its domestic and international legitimacy. Afghan people, especially women, remain excluded and abandoned, while regional actors gain influence and access to resources. Diplomacy has not forced them to change internally, but remains a risk of normalising a regime that practices gender apartheid. It sends a dangerous message that it can be accepted without reform, an armed takeover, and repression.
Everything now depends on whether a state will demand fundamental reforms in exchange for engagement. Otherwise, the Taliban will keep operating on two levels. Their gradual normalisation could soon reach far beyond the region, including Europe.
36 Years After the Fall of the Berlin Wall
Is Germany Still Divided Between West And East?
By Beatrice Bianchi
36 years ago, the fall of the Berlin Wall represented a turning point for Germany and, later, for the entire world: on 9th November 1989, the division between the East and the West stopped to exist, and families, as well as the whole population, began to think on how to rebuild a disrupted country, trying not to consider the 28 years of separation and the political and economic differences that were present. Reunification seemed impossible at first, as many countries sought only to advance their interests, without considering other options. A radical transformation was necessary to make the process “smoother”; however, on 3rd October 1990, the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany united, marking the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR.
From those days, Germany has experienced many changes and events: the country has, in fact, successfully built a powerful image that other European countries will never be able to replicate, being considered one of the most trusted countries in the world in the financial and industrial aspects and facing directly catastrophes like the 2008 crisis without being deeply affected. Even if, for some people (mainly European immigrants), the “German dream” was achievable, continuing to create and inspire this image of a rather perfect country to live, thrive, and work in was (and still is) different for West and East Germans.
To begin with, the area we refer to as the East is much smaller than its geographical counterpart, with only 16 million inhabitants compared to the 67 million in the West, and only 5 regions (excluding Berlin) are included in this definition. They are even the poorest: noteworthy are therefore the productivity index, which remains lower in the Eastern areas even after adjustment for population, and the unemployment rate, which differs by 2.1 % between the East and the West.
This economic imbalance became more evident after the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020, as productivity declined. A massive wave of unemployment unexpectedly hit the country, forcing manufacturing giants like Volkswagen to shut down plants or change the strategy to cope with the situation: since such industries were the heart of the economy for the Eastern regions, this problem was perceived like a catastrophe, making the population think that the Government would not have helped them at all in finding a new job, sending some sort of relief package, or persuading Volkswagen to wait before acting drastically, since they were not of significative importance at the eyes of the Parliament.
However, such inequality has not been a problem in recent years, as differences have become clearer from the beginning, and therefore from the reunification. The East was, in a certain way, set aside by the most “economically and technologically advanced” West: the development of the new nation began in the Western regions, while, on the other side, the East had to recover from the “wounds” of communist influence. The resentment of Eastern regions for being left behind in the reconstruction of Germany grew indeed in these 30 years: from being under a system inspired by the USSR, they were put in a new one where their requests weren’t listened to or satisfied, as they were fewer and poorer, therefore thinking that they were not significant for the representative organs.
Since this situation happened, it is noteworthy how the regions had developed a more radical and conservative view: the East is anti-European, against immigration waves, and showing its support to the far-right, like it has been represented on the charts of the previous parliamentary elections, where it can be seen a “blue wave” (that of AfD) along all the 5 Bundes.
Knowing how the elections went and considering that COVID-19’s effects are still harming the nation, this fracture between East and West is not going to heal; differences will continue to keep the two macro-regions separated. Since the new parliamentary coalition has not reached a solid majority, the far-right Eastern groups are pushing for greater representation in the Government, making everyone reconsider the role of the East in the political landscape and wonder whether the situation will change again if their needs were to be listened to.
30 Years of Genocide
Sudan’s Endless Crisis and the Fall of Darfur
By Sofia Giandomenico
In recent weeks, satellite imagery of Darfur, Sudan, has revealed streets stained with blood. The situation has been described as the most severe humanitarian crisis of our time, marked by the killing of men and the widespread sexual violence against women. This raises a question: who is responsible for these atrocities, and how has the situation deteriorated to such a critical point?
The problem arises from the complex situation in Darfur. Sudan is a very vast country, ethnically and religiously mixed: it is mainly constituted of Arab Muslims, who in areas such as Darfur live alongside non-Arab Muslims, including indigenous populations like the Masalit and the Fur (where the name of the region comes from). Arab Muslims have long been in conflict with other ethnic groups in Sudan, not only in Darfur. For instance, South Sudan gained independence in 2011 primarily because of similar tensions. However, the conflict in Darfur is driven not only by ethnic differences but also by the desire to control the region’s abundant mineral resources, such as gold.
Because of these reasons, for the last years, the Darfur region has been experiencing one of the most brutal ethnic cleansings in modern times. These actions are done by a militia group once known as the Janjaweed, composed of Arab Muslims, which targets the Masalit, the Fur, and other populations that live in the area. The Janjaweed, which means “mounted demons” in Sudanese, were highly encouraged by the infamous Sudanese dictator al-Bashir, who ruled from 1989 to 2019, to continue attacking the indigenous populations. But their actions didn’t go unnoticed. In 2007, the International Court of Justice ruled over this case: they accused the Sudanese government of not acting against the Janjaweed and of ignoring the victims’ rights. Besides this, they classified the Janjaweed’s actions as war crimes. These events became media-savvy in the 2000s, with the very popular slogan “Save Darfur,” and saw celebrities such as Bradley Cooper on the front lines calling for an end to the carnage. Still, al-Bashir kept encouraging the Janjaweed, and in 2013 he formalised them as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), putting General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, in charge. He was already known as one of the main leaders of the Janjaweed and, later in 2017, he led his forces to take control of Darfur’s biggest gold mine, Jebel Amir, which made him one of the wealthiest men in Sudan. Al-Bashir made the RSF a branch of the military, yet this did not satisfy Hemedti.
In 2019, widespread protests erupted in Sudan, calling for democracy, and while al-Bashir ordered the army to act, Hemedti and other generals were planning on deposing him. For two years, a provisional government oversaw the country and liberalised religious freedom, criminalised female genital mutilation. It lifted the ban on alcohol for non-Muslims. But it did not last for long. In October 2021, General Burhan put an end to the provisional government through a military coup and appointed Hemedti as his vice president. This government was again short-lived due to disagreements between Burhan and Hemedti over the RSF. Burhan wanted their disbandment, while Hemedti wished to keep his militia. At the end, they reached a compromise: in 10 years, the RSF would’ve been integrated into the Sudanese army. It clearly didn’t satisfy either party, because in April 2023, Hemedti and his militia carried out another military coup.
From that moment, a horrible war broke out between Hemedti alongside the RSF and Burhan with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The two sides have been fighting for control over territories, particularly in the Darfur region, where, since 2023, an estimated 150,000 people have been killed, a number that has led the Biden administration in the US to define the situation as a genocide. Both sides have economic support from different countries, even though none of them has explicitly come out in their support: the SAF backed by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, while the RSF is backed by the UAE and Russia.
From April 2024 until recently, one of the biggest cities in Darfur, El Fasher, was under siege by the RSF. Still, it remained the only city to keep resisting. On October 27th, 2025, El Fasher fell. Since then, satellite images and videos that have been posted online in various forums show the massacre that has been happening in the city. Up until then, diplomatic efforts were made to end the war. On September 12th, the US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE (collectively known as the Quad) announced the first peace talks with Sudan, starting with a three-month truce. No side agreed to this, with Burhan rejecting it and the RSF initially ignoring it. On November 4th, almost two months after the proposal, the RSF agreed to the ceasefire, adding that they looked forward to discussions on ending the hostilities. The UN has also called an emergency meeting on the situation in El Fasher, after calling this the world’s largest humanitarian crisis, estimating that more than 24 million people in Sudan are experiencing food shortages, even critical shortages in some areas.
Unfortunately, for many, lasting peace remains out of reach. Achieving it would require addressing the deep-rooted divisions among ethnic groups while balancing the economic interests surrounding the gold mines. Until these issues are confronted, stability in the region will remain uncertain.
Sustainability: What Does it Really Mean?
Beyond Buzzwords: Rebuilding a Concept of Responsibility
By Cristiano Nardelli
In recent years, one of the most extensively debated areas of International Law has been the International Legal Protection of the Environment: a discussion arising from the difficulty of achieving consensus among states, despite significant political divisions, regarding the perceived threats to the global environment, the appropriate measures to address them, and the allocation of responsibility for environmental degradation. Developed industrialised nations, which have largely contributed to environmental degradation through their industrial activities, often demonstrate reluctance to alter their practices. Conversely, less developed nations advocate for an equitable principle, arguing that if others have profited from industrialisation, they too should have the opportunity to grow, regardless of potential consequences. The argument posits that those who accrued wealth at the expense of environmental harm should bear the financial burden of remediation.
Due to these complexities, fragile compromises often characterise international environmental law. The role of diplomats has thus become increasingly important, as they serve as defenders of intergovernmental dialogue, which is fundamental to defining the modes of personal and collective responsibility that apply in cases of environmental harm. In the near future, the compromises that form the basis of International Environmental Law necessitate the intervention of diplomats, tasked with advancing new negotiation mechanisms and techniques to foster regulatory frameworks. Environmental Law stands out as a branch of international law wherein institutionalisation often transpires through highly informal means: in the absence of a dedicated international organisation or office to manage global environmental issues, much of the pertinent dialogue occurs during regular meetings or conferences, culminating in multilateral agreements such as the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm (1972) and the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro (1992).
The evolution of negotiation techniques and the introduction of new conceptual categories are imperative in this discourse. While there has been a longstanding endeavour to categorise environmental damages alongside other forms of wrongdoing (see, for instance, United States v. Canada, 1941; Hungary v. Slovakia, ICJ, 1997; Argentina v. Uruguay, ICJ, 2010), it has become apparent that the environmental discourse necessitates its own logical and legal framework, within which to develop new categories. One of the most significant concepts to emerge is sustainability. This term, derived from the 1987 Brundtland Report, has, over the years, fallen prey to imprecise usage. The ambiguity stems from the absence of an unequivocal definition that delineates the boundary between legitimate and abusive uses of the noun. To assist our diplomatic readers and clarify the linguistic nuances of this word, I propose a systematic examination of the often-blurred boundaries of its appropriate use.
Primarily through the scientific episteme, we may understand the meaning of sustainability particularly within the agricultural sector. In this context, “sustainable” refers to a harvest that can be bolstered indefinitely without becoming unproductive or harming the soil. Yet, the etymology of the idiom is overriding: “sustainability” originates from the Latin verb “sustinēre”, composed of “sub-”, meaning “under”, and “tenēre”, meaning “to hold”, suggesting a notion of support, raising, and advancement, integrating a forward-looking perspective. Prominently introduced in “Our Common Future” (the above-mentioned 1987 report by the Brundtland Commission), “sustainability” indeed emphasized a fundamental shift towards a bottom-up approach to economic practices, shaping an interpretation that has since influenced initiatives such as the Green Deal, the 2030 Agenda, and the Next Generation EU. The recognition of dilemmas within the existing economic development model had been apparent since the 1970s, particularly through the momentous reports by the Club of Rome, “Limits to Growth” and “Mankind at the Turning Point”. These statements addressed the long-term issue of resource scarcity concerning both individuals and society. It is important to note that the Brundtland Commission advocates for “sustainable development” in the same fashion, defining it as the “Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. Evidently, it marks a shift from a purely scientific and ecological emphasis to one that is more social and anthropological, where economic considerations offer a valuable approach to tackling challenges in resource allocation. And overall, it encourages a collective development strategy, ensuring that all individuals have access to economic and environmental resources according to their needs. Seemingly, each person ideally becomes a stakeholder in the ecological, economic, and social challenges arising from industrialisation.
Part of this discussion arises from a foundational work in the conceptualisation of sustainable development: “The Principle of Responsibility” (1979) by the German philosopher Hans Jonas. By tracing the principle of responsibility toward the environment back to a Kantian imperative, Jonas provides a philosophical rationale for restricting the freedom of humanity today to ensure the right to life for future generations: this is not primarily about a perceived obligation of the current generation to those yet to come; it is rather about a responsibility to uphold the very essence of humanity. For Jonas, the guiding principle in our decision-making should be “the guidance of fear”, suggesting that “we ought to give greater weight to warnings of impending doom rather than optimistic forecasts”, a notion later integrated into the precautionary principle outlined in the European Commission Communication of February 2, 2002. Thus, what emerges is a behavioural reference that is certainly futurable, but which demands application from the present: the forthcoming generations mentioned in the Brundtland Report, far from belonging to a outlying or undetermined future (and, thus, not even being the generation of our grandchildren, as Professor Alfredo Milanaccio assumes), are in fact those who are already alive and standing, so much so that we should speak of “sustainable relationships”, and for which the Church of Pope Francis has been able to outline a highly relevant deontology (see, for instance, “Laudato Si”, “Caritas in Veritate”, “Fratelli Tutti”).
This solidarity-driven, contemporary approach to exegesis should likely inform sustainable development in international law and relations. International jurisprudence is ascertaining it, notably in the Neubauer ruling (2021) of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, which addressed the 2019 Federal Climate Act. A coalition of citizens from Bangladesh and Nepal, along with German activists, argued that the law was insufficient to safeguard the right to life and physical integrity, and to ensure a future that honours human dignity and meets an ecological minimum standard of living. While the German Constitutional Court did not recognize the existence of such rights, other EU constitutional courts, specifically those of Italy, France, Spain, and Portugal, have begun an exchange on this issue. This dialogue ultimately led to the publication of a booklet titled “The rights of future generations: environment and health”, which aims to establish a conceptual framework for the recognition and protection of these rights.
A comprehensive definition of sustainability, fully incorporating the social dimension and mitigating the risk of subjective interpretation, is manifestly essential at both the legal and political ranks. Helpfully, International Law could once again serve as a forum for recognizing human rights and facilitating the development of an unambiguous definition of the term (drawing on the practice of philosophical hermeneutics, which has traditionally focused on the meanings of words). The danger of misinterpreting the idiom is primarily practical: diplomats often find themselves engaged in complex negotiations where they cannot definitively rely on a noun as critical as “sustainability”. Its ambiguity allows parties to determine for themselves what constitutes sustainable behaviour, resulting in clearly harmful consequences for the environment, and society at large.
Romani People and Their Place in the Global Order
A Stateless Nation’s Struggle for Dignity and Recognition
By Konstantin Zametica
In our contemporary political perceptions, it is intuitive and common sense that nations as independent political communities can prosper only when strong institutions exist to protect their existence, identity, and further development. The lack of these institutions led many people to fight for their establishment, which typically resulted in the creation of independent states, the strongest guarantors of the people’s freedom and welfare. The shared sense of struggle among members of the same culture, ethnic group, etc., ensured strong social bonds that served as the basis for creating political, social, cultural, and economic institutions to underpin their identity, lest they be erased from historical records. The examples are numerous. In my native Serbia, for centuries we fought against the Ottoman, Austrian and Venetian repression. The Jews struggled for thousands of years to ensure their existence. In contemporary times, the Kurds and their situation might be the most archetypal example of a fight for a nation-state, given their sheer numbers and their distinctiveness from their neighbours. The rule seems to be that if a particular group (be it religious, ethnic, linguistic, etc.) is oppressed in any way, minor or major, they will demand institutions of their own to protect themselves.
Historically, the establishment of an independent state was typically the end goal of these struggles, as the creation of a state was perceived as the only effective and long-term solution to the problems faced by oppressed groups. The existence of a nation-state is the ultimate manifestation of the political will of any nation. Ethnic groups lacking a nation-state are always in danger of disappearing from history, and the state has become the best instrument through which politics is exercised. One would think that a group without a nation-state or any other relevant political institution would not survive as a clearly defined and distinctive community for long. However, there is an exceptional outlier to this law. Let us talk about the Romani.
Roma people originate from modern-day India and Pakistan, specifically the Punjab region. Other than that, little is known about their early history, as there are few written sources. From the later written history, we see that they were almost exclusively nomadic, a fact that persists to this day. Estimates vary on when they arrived in Europe, with the earliest assessment placing it in the 7th century in the Balkans. From there, their wandering lifestyle took them to most corners of the world.
Early on, they faced prosecution. For one reason or another, they were never fully admitted into other societies and were looked down upon. This omnipresent discrimination, combined with their nomadic lifestyle, ensured that most Roma people would remain poor for generations, yet another trend that is regrettably consistent to this day. The modern efforts to assimilate Romani have largely failed. They remain poor, underprivileged, and associated with negative stereotypes.
The question that arises is why these assimilation efforts failed, and how Romani remain Romani despite the adverse conditions they face? Discrimination obviously plays a part in answering this question, but also their unique culture. The sense of kinship they share transcends borders, and they preserve their identity wherever they are, without any formal institution to help them. The institutions they do possess are few in number and largely irrelevant. Organizations such as the World Romani Congress, political parties in different countries that promote Romani interests, and several NGOs do not have the reach or the impact they aspire to. Roma remain poor and excluded from society, and these organizations do not inspire confidence among the Roma.
The dominant model of political organization, the nation-state, has perhaps inadvertently put the Roma in a difficult position. The political culture of the Roma is largely incompatible with the modern iteration of the state, and they suffer because of it. There is little space for the Roma to explore other forms of political existence due to the predominance of the modern state idea. However, another thing worth mentioning is that the Roma experience challenges the notion that the nation-state is the most effective tool for protecting a separate national identity. The resilience of Romani culture provides evidence for this claim, as they have retained their traditions and sense of self for centuries.
Whether the Romani should establish their own state is up to them. It would definitely solve many problems plaguing them. The fact that the vast majority of Romani do not demand this is revealing. There were a few instances in history when some Roma leaders did, in fact, petition foreign governments to help them establish an independent state. Still, these efforts were ignored and did not meet popular support among the Romani themselves. Their political culture does not demand expression through the state, but, having that in mind, the path forward for the Romani is not clear, and it is yet to be seen whether a compromise between their unique way of life and the modern state can be reached.
Will International Law Survive Gaza? Insights from Prof. Michaelsen
Four Paradigms for Understanding a Legal Crisis
By Giulia Diurni
On October 7th, I had the opportunity to interview my Public International Law Professor, Christopher Michaelsen, a Full Professor of International Law at the School of Law, Western Sydney University (WSU) in Sydney, Australia, and Adjunct Professor of International Law at LUISS. Together, we discussed one of the most controversial yet popular topics in current affairs: the Israel-Palestine issue.
To begin with, it is necessary to provide context for this complex situation. Prof. Michaelsen argues that multiple international legal frameworks apply. From an international law angle, the first step is to identify and break down the specific frameworks under consideration. For instance, one key question is whether Israel had a legitimate right to self-defence in response to the Hamas attacks on 7th October 2023: the use of force is one of the international legal paradigms that are applicable in this context. However, this does not preclude debate over the actual exercise of the right of self-defence, as it is difficult to equate Hamas with the state of Palestine. And so, this places distinct limitations on Israel’s military operations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
A second paradigm, according to Prof. Michaelsen, concerns international law relating to genocide. The 1951 Genocide Convention (to which Israel itself is a party) raises the key question of whether Israel’s conduct in Gaza meets the Convention’s requirement of “intent to destroy”. Repeated statements by Israeli officials and military commanders would suggest that this requirement occurred in the case of Gaza, but the verdict of the International Court of Justice is still outstanding in the case brought by South Africa against Israel. A recent report from the UN Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry into the Human Rights situation in Palestine and Israel, on the other hand, has found that the legal threshold of genocide was met in Gaza.
In addition, Prof. Michaelsen identified two other paradigms: international criminal law and international humanitarian law, as well as human rights law. For example, the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, is subject to an arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court. Here, the main controversy relates to the jurisdiction of the Court, as Israel is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, whereas Palestine is. The consideration of these four paradigms confirms a key dilemma of international law: it is not the absence of rules and norms, but rather the challenge of ensuring compliance with them.
At the time of the interview, news had just emerged about the IDF’s interception of the Global Sumud Flotilla in international waters, as well as renewed debate over the legitimacy of a naval blockade imposed by Israel since 2009. Prof. Michelsen pointed out that even assuming that a blockade is a lawful means of naval warfare, this does not extend to blocking humanitarian aid. By intercepting the Flotilla, Israel effectively prevented the delivery of such assistance, making the act itself unlawful. This invites a separate point from the legality of the interception, since interception on the high seas is, generally, not permissible under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which defines the high seas as everything beyond the 12-nautical-mile territorial zone. Here, the context is complicated because the Flotilla included several vessels; some did not enter the 12 nautical mile zone, while others did. For the ones that entered, the legal matter revolves around the status of the coastal waters off the Gaza Strip. In the Oslo Accords, Israel had agreed that the territorial waters of Gaza are not Israeli waters. If that is the case, the Israeli Defence Forces cannot lawfully conduct enforcement operations in Palestinian territorial waters: how should we, then, classify the waters off the coast of the Gaza Strip?
Then, I asked the professor about the declarations that various activists on the Flotilla made regarding alleged Human Rights violations during their arrest by Israeli military forces. My question was: “Since it is necessary first to establish the facts in relation to each individual, if the actions they described actually occurred, can we speak about violation of human rights?” The Professor replied: “Whether it be under international human rights law, or whether it be under the laws of armed conflict, there is this obligation to treat detainees, prisoners of war, or civilians humanely and not subject them to what is called ill-treatment. There is a clear prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, and not every infringement needs to amount to torture to trigger this protection”. Prof. Michaelsen mentioned Article 7 of the ICCPR, to which Israel is a party, prohibits ill-treatment.
How can juridical responsibility be defined in this case? As noted by the Professor, Hamas, as a party to an armed conflict, has the same obligations under International Humanitarian Law that Israel has. Neither of them can attack and take civilian hostages, and it would be one-sided to simply point the finger at the Israeli Defence Force for violations, because Hamas transgressions have occurred as well. The topic raised here is about politics and morality since the law applies equally to all participants in the dispute.
At the time of the interview, Trump’s intention to establish a plan of peace was announced. The main concern raised was whether such a plan would jeopardise the principles of representation and sovereignty of the Palestinian people. Relying on Prof. Michaelsen’s opinion, there are two approaches. The first one is a political approach: addressing the conflict from an international position, which necessarily involves the USA’s participation. From a political standpoint, nothing happens without the USA. Therefore, for the violence to end, USA pressure and a process led by the USA are essential, even if one disagrees with the way this procedure is being implemented for political reasons. The second one is rights-based: the right to self-determination must guide any future Palestinian state and its relationship with Israel. This means involving the people who hold this right, which is the Palestinians. At the same time, Israel also has a right to self-determination. However, competing claims to self-determination in the same territory are not unusual in International Law and do not prevent the exercise of either right, but excluding Palestinians from the process is unacceptable from a rights-based perspective and, perhaps, even from a political perspective.
All this considered, how will international law change, and what could we expect from the Middle East case? Prof. Michaelsen’s answer was clear: “I do not think International Law will change. The bigger claim is whether the manifest and extensive breach of International Law by Israel will encourage other states to behave similarly. Will other states be emboldened by Israel’s noncompliance and act in a similarly lawless fashion because they see that even large-scale violations of international law do not really have any consequences? That, I think, is the big risk. Gaza and the whole situation there are part of a broader dynamic of certain states moving away from complying with international law. On the other hand, coming back to the very first question, we are seeing an unprecedented application of international law to the Gaza conflict. This does not mean that the atrocities are being prevented, but what is happening is that a net of accountability is being spun around the conflict. This has led to Netanyahu being subjected to an arrest warrant and the UN Commission of Inquiry determining that what is happening in Gaza amounts to genocide. From a historical perspective, that is a massive step forward because no such mechanisms existed during the Holocaust or other genocides in history. Even in more recent times, like in Rwanda or the former Yugoslavia, there was not the same level of oversight and systematic recording of events. Documenting facts and testimonies is always the first step toward establishing responsibility. In that sense, this is a valuable contribution of the UN mechanisms, even though, as we all know, they have not really succeeded in preventing human suffering”.
The United Kingdom and Its Externalising Migration Management with France
How the Channel Became a Shared Frontier
By Tristan Pascal
Immigration externalisation policies have become commonplace in the management of migration flows. States pay other states to manage migration flows on their behalf. Partnerships are being formed to transfer asylum seekers awaiting the processing of their applications from one country to another.
These practices of externalising migration management are not new, but with the exponential increase in migration flows, the management of migrants and asylum seekers has become a key issue in diplomatic relations but also created opportunities for cooperation between states.
In the context of the United Kingdom and Brexit, it is evident that it was motivated in part by a desire to “take back control” of its borders and the labour market, in response to the perception that migration from the EU was putting downward pressure on wages and working conditions. The United Kingdom introduced more restrictive immigration policies for EU and non-EU workers.
On the other hand, to deal with the waves of illegal immigration that continue to increase since leaving the EU, the United Kingdom continued to shift the responsibility for border control to third countries, like France.
The case of the United Kingdom with France is particularly interesting because there is a longstanding history of cooperation between the two countries regarding unauthorised migration. It took several agreements to establish the level of cooperation that exists today. The Sangatte Protocol (1991), the Treaty of Le Touquet (2003) and the Sandhurst Treaty (2018) provided a legal framework and enabled both France and the United Kingdom to conduct immigration control operation in each other’s territories.
In March 2023, a bilateral summit between UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and French President Emanuel Macron led to a joint declaration, with the UK committing 541 million euros between 2023 and 2026 to enhance border security and surveillance along the French coast. In 2025 this three-year deal was extended until 2027, adding 8 million euros to the previous contribution to be able to support “new stronger enforcement plans”.
What exactly does this migration deal include? This agreement enables the British Border Patrol to operate directly in French waters. The fundings help France to have “1,200 security personnel deployable daily on coastal smuggler operations. Some 730 of them are paid for by the British”. In addition to these human resources, technical resources are also used, such as drones equipped with thermal cameras, helicopters, aircrafts, beach buggies, and reservist officers, to intercept people attempting to cross the Channel. The plan also includes the creation of a new command centre and a migrant detention centre in Calais. As a result of this enhanced cooperation, French police have intervened more on the beaches since the 2023 UK-France funding agreement.
In July 2025, alongside the agreement to coordinate the use of their nuclear weapons, the UK prime minister Keir Starmer announced further cooperation with its French ally concerning the return of migrants to France. The plan introduced a new scheme called “one in one out”, where the UK can send back to the continent illegal migrants trying to enter the country by boat. In exchange, they will have to accept the same number of asylum seekers who are currently waiting in France, provided that certain conditions are met. Asylum seekers will need to have legitimate ties to the UK and must not have previously attempted to enter the country illegally.
This ‘one in, one out’ deal, which could see up to 50 people return to the EU each week (2,600 per year), is crucial for the UK. The number of migrants returned to the EU has fallen drastically since the UK left the Dublin Agreement, which aimed to facilitate the transfer of asylum seekers between EU member states. After Brexit, around 60 Channel migrants a year were returned to the EU in 2023 and 2024, compared to around 130 in 2019 and 2020.
The renewal of this partnership clearly demonstrates the United Kingdom’s continued engagement with the EU, rather than a complete withdrawal. The UK has pursued to sign multiple bilateral declarations and statements with other EU member states. These statements explicitly reference with broader UK-EU cooperation framework, showing the UK’s strategy to maintain pragmatic ties while navigating the post-Brexit landscape.
However, by refusing to join the EU’s asylum cooperation rules wholesale, the UK will not be able to access the Eurodac asylum database, which enables member states to identify people who had already applied for asylum. France can only share some data bilaterally if they chose to, but access to the Eurodac would require consent from the EU as a whole.
It is important to note that externalization policies can affect trust and future cooperation between countries. The UK’s approach to migration management has been met with scepticism and criticism from international partners, including the EU and human rights organizations.
The EU could indeed undermine cooperation between France and the UK, since it already reminded that France must respect European asylum law and the Dublin Convention. The European Commission has declared that the “one in, one out” agreement must be evaluated to ensure that EU support goes to “solutions that are compatible with the spirit and the letter of EU law”.
Given the European Union’s explicit warnings to France, the future of this deal remains quite uncertain. While France is still subject to European regulations, the question is to what extent the EU will take enforcement action to ensure adherence. This uncertainty is further compounded by controversial practices. In March 2024 a collaborative investigation by Lighthouse Reports, the Observer, Le Monde and Der Spiegel uncovered evidence that French police, with the help of the UK funding, had employed “aggressive pullback interception techniques” to intercept and turn back small migrant vessels operating within French territorial waters.
Prove Me Wrong
Invade Venezuela, You Say? Wait, I’ve Seen This One Before!
By Gonzalo Rodao
Prove Me Wrong is a column that dares to challenge conventional wisdom in international affairs, one “hot take” at a time. Each piece begins with a claim that might sound controversial, but is backed by analysis and grounded in fact. The goal isn’t to preach, but to provoke discussion and critical thinking among readers who care about diplomacy, politics, and global change. Agree or disagree, please just don’t stay indifferent.
When campaigning for his first term, Donald Trump made it unequivocally clear that one of his main electoral promises was to end America’s “endless wars” and break away from the Wilsonian interventionist foreign policy of previous presidents. However, this does not seem to hold in the context of Venezuela. Military threats, maximal sanctions, accusations of “narco-terrorism”, naval deployment, and drone strikes targeting what we are told are drug traffickers’ vessels “loaded with enough drugs to kill 25 TO 50 THOUSAND PEOPLE [sic]”: Trump’s rhetoric has turned increasingly hostile, never denying the possibility of military intervention. Despite boasting to have ended eight wars since returning to office in 2025 and claiming he was worthy of being the recipient of the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize, why is he so hellbent on stoking the flames of war? Could he be bluffing? The posturing, a mere sign of negotiation tactics? Or could this be a way to distract everyone from other pressing issues, particularly on the domestic front? I am not going to pretend to know his intentions behind all of this. However, I would like to present to you, the reader, what strikes me as a very familiar feeling from someone with a decent handle on South American political history; Trump is copying straight from the Latin American dictator playbook.
This is not the first time that Trump has Venezuela in his sights. As early as 2017, he warned us that he was not ruling out the military option against Caracas. At the same time, his administration has already employed the economic strongarm, slapping sanctions on PDVSA, the Venezuelan state-owned oil and natural gas company. Central to Venezuela’s economy, it accounts for a whopping 58% of its government revenue. Combined with the recent repositioning of the world’s largest aircraft carrier in the Caribbean theater and the recent refurbishing of various airfields and old military bases in Puerto Rico and in the US Virgin Islands (as well as authorizing CIA operations inside Venezuela), it is clear that Trump could at any point go straight for the jugular and remove Maduro through force in a matter of days. The big question is, will he? That is the million-dollar question after all. One thing is clear: this is not simply improvised. John Bolton, the former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (NSA), did not mince words when he declared that “the Monroe Doctrine is alive and well” in 2019. This means that the United States considers Latin America as its backyard. The message is clear: the US reserves the right to intervene, sanction, and, if possible, remove regimes that are not compatible with it, often hiding behind the discourse of defending human rights and democracy.
This “will he, won’t he,” however, can be seen in a different light. Venezuela can also serve as a powerful distracting tool. A master at dominating the news cycle whether positively or negatively, Trump certainly wishes for the Epstein files saga to end once and for all. Unfortunately for him, the latest reports on the Epstein case are becoming increasingly incriminating for the president (who, I remind the reader, ran on the promise of releasing them). A military deployment would help refocus the debate on “strong president against tyrannical socialist dictator”. Of course, this kind of event would garner a lot of American media coverage (especially since it has been a while since the US has directly intervened in Latin America this overtly). This is not a conspiracy theory, instead a pattern: a foreign crisis to control the domestic political rhythm at low military cost and with high symbolic value. On top of that, as a Westerner, it is harder to root for Maduro, whether on his continuation of Chavez’s authoritarian regime or his dubious human rights track record on political opponents.
Chavez, like many other “strongman” Latin American presidents (i.e. Perón, Stroessner, and Fujimori) also known as “caudillos,” had an obvious modus operandi.
Firstly: they present themselves as the saviour of the nation versus an internal or external enemy (communists, imperialism, the “establishment”)
Secondly, they concentrate power around their person, almost like a cult of personality, reducing their party to nothing more than a fan club.
Thirdly, they don’t hesitate use the army, the police, and the court system as political tools. (Hello, ICE and the National Guard?)
Lastly, they launch external operations, manufactured crises, or repression campaigns to distract when scandals blow up.
Trump is doing precisely that, but with the tools of a world superpower. But in a world of democratic backsliding, the country that once was described as the “city on a hill,” a beacon of democracy, hope, and freedom around the world, the ramifications of engaging in such anti-democratic actions will surely leave an indelible mark on American democratic hegemonism in the decade ahead.
Add to this the time factor and assuming this is his final term (despite Steve Bannon being convinced Trump 2028 is a thing), the more he advances in his term, the weaker the impunity he has benefited from the GOP will be. For years, Trump has been the incontestable leader of the GOP. Almost everyone from the GOP has “bent the knee” either by conviction or from political survival, lest they be eaten alive by the MAGA fanbase. When a caudillo gets old or nears the end of his mandate, the elite around him starts preparing for what comes next: clans form, heirs position themselves, knives come out behind the scenes. That is precisely what’s happening in the Republican Party. For years, Trump was untouchable. Now his aura is starting to crack. Frontrunners like JD Vance and Marco Rubio, the Secretary of State, are positioning themselves to succeed Trump. This is incredibly apparent when looking at the case of Ukraine and the “JD Vance”-backed peace talks that heavily tilted towards Russia, working behind the back of Rubio. Another crack in the mirror is the case is Marjorie Taylor Greene. A hardcore MAGA symbol, fully aligned with every conspiracy spiral, she looked like she had absolute loyalty to the boss. And yet she ends up breaking that pact, announcing she’s leaving and attacking Trump on key issues, including how he handled Israel and healthcare subsidies. That’s exactly what you see in late-stage personalist regimes: the ultra-loyalist who, once she sees the ship taking on water, repositions and breaks with the leader.
Venezuela, in that picture, isn’t just one more Latin American tragedy. It’s a mirror held up to Washington. In it, you see an American president who, instead of defending a credible democratic model, is sliding into the reflexes of those Southern strongmen we used to hold up as the cautionary tale of what not to become. The caudillo this time doesn’t speak Spanish. He’s tweeting in English from the White House. Prove me wrong.
Feel strongly and disagree with my article? Then by all means, come chat with me @gonzo_elterrible on Instagram and prove me wrong!
Have Your Cake and Eat It Too?
The Green Transition vs. Competitiveness
By Flora Jannotti Testa
New column alert! Every month, this column explores a new theme, usually framed as a dilemma. Think of it like the Trolley Problem, but for politics, economics, and diplomacy. My goal each month? To see whether these “dilemmas” are actually dilemmas at all, or whether it is possible to get the best of both worlds. In other words, must we really pick the red pill or the blue pill?
If you’re into EU affairs, you’ll definitely have heard of the European Green Deal (EGD): the EU’s flagship project to cut greenhouse gas emissions, achieve climate neutrality, and make Europe “Fit for 55.” But if you’ve followed EU politics over the past year, you’ll also know that enthusiasm for these green goals has been fading. The new buzzword in Brussels? Competitiveness. And especially vis-à-vis other global players, such as the U.S. and China. For the Union, competitiveness means strengthening its economic foundations while keeping the green transition at the centre. This includes fostering growth-friendly business conditions, promoting cleaner industries, boosting innovation and digitalisation, and addressing the labour and skills gaps needed for a more resilient, forward-looking economy. These are ambitious goals, and while EU institutions try to frame them within the context of a clean and sustainable transition, critics are increasingly vocal about the supposed incompatibility of the two agendas.
On the populist right, criticism has been particularly fierce. Giorgia Meloni (Italian Prime Minister) has warned that rigid green policies under the EGD “risk industrial desertification” in Europe, especially in the automotive sector. She’s described parts of the Green Deal as “ideological” and pledged to push for revisions, emphasising the need to protect European industry and competitiveness rather than rush headlong into electric mobility. Even more bluntly, Beata Szydło (a Polish MEP and former Prime Minister of Poland) has argued that the Green Deal is harming competitiveness and social welfare. In April 2024, she went as far as to call it the ruin of Europe, saying: “People can’t pay their bills, people see no future, because of the Green Deal … The green ideology, which you’ve tried to ram down the throats of Europeans, doesn’t give Europe a future.”
On the other side of the debate, some see the Green Deal not as a threat to competitiveness but as the very foundation of Europe’s future prosperity. Pascal Canfin (French MEP, Chair of the Parliament’s Environment Committee) insists that EU trade and industrial policies must not contradict the Green Deal’s climate objectives. He famously argued that the EU-Mercosur trade deal could not be ratified because it contradicted Europe’s plans to confront the climate emergency. For Canfin, delaying or weakening the EGD risks not just climate progress but Europe’s leadership and sovereignty. Similarly, Frans Timmermans (former European Commission Executive Vice-President for the Green Deal) has been clear: the Green Deal is “our new growth strategy”. In his view, the EGD reconciles economy and ecology rather than pitting them against each other. To him, it’s about transforming Europe’s economy, not burdening it.
Together, these figures embody the counter-narrative to the “Green Deal harms competitiveness” line. They argue that ambitious green policies strengthen rather than undermine competitiveness by fostering innovation, first-mover advantage, and new industries. In this view, “competitiveness vs. climate” is a false dichotomy: Europe needs both, but cannot sacrifice one for the other.
Nevertheless, even from a more neutral or technocratic standpoint, the tension between the two goals can’t be ignored. Mario Draghi’s 2024 report on EU competitiveness notes that “competitiveness often gets equated with reducing regulatory burdens or is seen as inversely related to the extent of regulation”. On the matter, he proposes replacing the current framework with a “joint decarbonisation and competitiveness plan”. His framing matters: it suggests that even at the highest policy levels, there’s recognition that the Green Deal may require significant adjustment.
So… can we have our cake and eat it too? When it comes to Green Transition vs. Competitiveness, no one denies the technical challenges of achieving both, nor the risks of failing at either. But in an era of rapid innovation and global transformation, the EU must stay clear-eyed and ambitious: lead by example, streamline its policies, and prove that climate ambition and competitiveness can reinforce each other. So yes, call me an optimist, but I believe we can and should do both.
Disagree? Great! Like all our columns at the Diplomatic Digest, this one’s meant to be a conversation. If you’ve got your own take on how to solve this dilemma, reach out for a chat!
This article was inspired by the book “Il falso dilemma” by Alfredo Macchiati and Simone Mori, both professors here at LUISS. For our Italian readers, I highly recommend checking it out if this topic sparked your curiosity.
Careers Flash
Beginning with this issue, The Diplomatic Digest is excited to introduce the Careers Flash: a section dedicated to showcasing career and educational opportunities in the areas of Diplomacy, International Relations, and International Law. This choice reflects LUSDA’s steadfast commitment to serving as a resource for professionals and academic programs in these fields. Our editorial team is devoted to identifying and presenting a range of esteemed opportunities, including Seasonal Schools, Conferences, Internships, Fellowships, and more, to support your journey in Diplomatic Studies.
Job Correspondent Internship
Deadline for the Application: 21 April 2026
Modality of the Activity: Telematic
Duration: 12 weeks
Institution: The World Organization for World Peace
Brief Description of the Activity: The internship involves writing 12 research articles over 12 weeks on international crises. Nine articles should be between 400 and 700 words, and three between 1000 and 1500 words. Participants contribute to promoting world peace through insightful analysis and reporting on global issues.
Requirements: Undergraduate or recent graduates enrolled in a degree program involving International Relations and Political Science. Excellent English writing skills.
Fees/Remuneration: Unpaid.
Interns Innovation & Analytics Hub
Deadline for the Application: May 1, 2026
Modality of the Activity : Flexible (encourages in-person but remote/part-time may be considered)
Duration: Minimum three months, extendable up to six months
Location: Geneva
Institution: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
Brief Description of the Activity: Reporting directly to the High Commissioner, the Hub is the United Nations’ first dedicated center for innovation and analytics in human rights. Interns work as full team members on projects with lasting impact, gaining insights into the UN System. Assignments fall into one of four workstreams: Strategic Coordination and Planning; Digital Transformation and AI; Data and Analytics; or Human Rights Risk Analysis and Early Warning.
Requirements: Enrolled in or completed a graduate school program (master’s equivalent) or the final year of a first university degree (bachelor’s equivalent). Studies relevant to the chosen workstream. Fluency in English required; knowledge of another UN language (French, Arabic, Chinese, Russian, or Spanish) is an advantage.
Fees/Remuneration: Unpaid (costs for travel, visas, accommodation, and living expenses are the responsibility of interns or sponsoring institutions). No fees charged.
Website: https://careers.un.org/jobSearchDescription/264777?language=en
Migration and Integration: Refugees, Rights & Realities
Deadline for the Application: 07 December 2025
Modality of the Activity: Telematic
Duration: 19 January - 30 January 2026
Institution: University of Amsterdam
Brief Description of the Activity: This two-week online winter course explores forced migration, displacement impacts, refugee rights, and integration challenges. It combines sociology, geopolitics, international refugee law, and anthropology to analyze global migration governance, state responses to crises, and gender dimensions of displacement. Participants engage in lectures and discussions with experts on theoretical insights and practical applications across various migration contexts, societal transformations, and integration efforts.
Requirements: Graduate level; open to students and professionals from diverse backgrounds. Motivated 3rd and 4th-year Bachelor students with a keen interest are welcome.
Fees/Remuneration: €900 (regular fee); €850 (Early Bird fee)
Website: https://www.summerschoolsineurope.eu/course/migration-and-integration-refugees-rights-realities-2/
States, People, and the Question of Identity in Europe
Deadline for the Application: Rolling registration throughout the year, subject to availability
Modality of the Activity: In-person
Duration: 05 January - 02 February 2026
Location: Tübingen, Germany
Institution: University of Tübingen
Brief Description of the Activity: This winter school track focuses on European concepts like pluralism, democracy, subsidiarity, and the rule of law. It tackles challenges such as nationalism, political fragmentation, migration, religion, identity, and war. The program includes German language classes (A1-A2), intercultural workshops, a buddy program, and social activities in Tübingen for cultural immersion and understanding of Europe’s diverse identities.
Requirements: Undergraduate students from all disciplines with a strong interest in cultures, Europe, and Germany; good command of English (B1-B2 or higher); no prior German knowledge required, but willingness for active participation is essential.
Fees/Remuneration: €1.950 (includes accommodation, courses, materials, excursions, welcome package, receptions, cultural/social activities, and public transportation ticket); €1.800 for students at partner universities of the University of Tübingen.
Website: https://www.summerschoolsineurope.eu/course/europe-diversity-and-the-question-of-identity/
Internship Opportunities in the Private Office of the British Embassy in Rome
Deadline for the Application: January 8, 2026
Modality of the Activity: In-person with partial remote working
Duration: 6 Months
Location: Rome, Italy
Institution: British Embassy Rome
Brief Description of the Activity: This six-month curricular internship offers positions in the British Embassy’s Private Office and the Ambassador’s Residence (Villa Wolkonsky). Interns handle diary management, event organization (meetings, lunches, dinners), guest lists, invitations, document preparation, travel arrangements, and logistics for events. Tasks include translating messages, updating contacts, assisting with budgets, and collaborating across teams for hands-on diplomatic and event management experience.
Requirements: Fluent English and Italian (C1 level); good IT skills (MS Outlook, Office, especially Excel); strong organisational and interpersonal skills; ability to work under pressure, prioritise tasks, and work independently or collaboratively; drafting and telephone skills; specialist interests desirable. Must be enrolled as a university student for the curricular internship.
Fees/Remuneration: €350 monthly allowance (untaxed); unpaid as per curricular internship terms
OECD Internship Programme
Deadline for the Application: 31 December 2025
Modality of the Activity: In-person
Duration: 1-6 Months
Location: Paris, France
Institution: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Brief Description of the Activity: The OECD Internship Programme involves qualified students in projects aligned with the Secretary-General’s Strategic Orientations, building analytical and technical skills in an international setting. Interns conduct research, analyze data, draft documents, and support policy areas like agriculture, AI, economy, education, and environment, plus corporate functions such as communications, finance, HR, and IT. They prepare studies, participate in meetings, organize events, and contribute to OECD initiatives on international co-operation and development.
Requirements: Full-time enrollment in a degree program related to OECD work; international experience is an asset; strong quantitative and IT skills (Microsoft Office Suite).